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COMMENTS
WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE TO ENFORCE THE
SUPREME COURT'S MANDATE TO DESEGREGATE
AND WHO MAY USE THEM*
By DONALD A. WAYt and Ric CAD M. SCHULZEt
Since the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,' in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that segregation by races in public
schools is in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, there has been little progress toward desegregation in most
Southern states.2 In some there has been no progress at all.' This has been
due to simple inaction on the part of state and local education officials, to
attempts at legalized evasion and to acts bordering on open rebellion. The
nature of the rights created by the Brown decision, the progress toward its
implemention, the means of evasion heretofore employed and those likely
to be employed in the future have been treated at length in a companion
article.4 There remain, however, the additional problems of determining
what judicial remedies are available to implement desegregation and what
persons or organizations as parties plaintiff are qualified to make use of
them.
It is generally conceded and it will be assumed for the purpose of this
comment, that any new legislation along remedial lines by the Congress of
the United States will be slow in coming if it is to come at all. A Southern
filibuster in the Senate is always a distinct probability whenever states'
rights matters are at issue and such a stumbling-block is a virtual certainty
when the proposed legislation is directed toward desegregation. Relief, then,
must be obtained from the already existing remedies available in the federal
courts. These remedies, discussed below, provide tools which if used with
diligence, wisdom and patience will be adequate to ultimately provide seg-
regation-free public schools in those states in which resistance has thus far
been encountered. The tools are in the form of injunctions, declaratory
judgments, suits for damages and even criminal prosecutions. They are
available to individual students who have been excluded, to parents or
guardians suing in the student's behalf, to organizations such as school
boards and to governmental officials such as United States attorneys.
* Companion Comment to 9 HAsnacs L.J. 42 (1957), The Segregation Decisions and the
Resulting Problems of Enforcement.
tMembers, Third-Year Class.
I Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; see also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
2 Time, Vol. LXX, No. 13, p.16 (Sept 23, 1957).
S Ibid.
4 9 E[Asnams LJ. 42 (1957).
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The Need for More Brown Decisions
The actions in Brown v. Board of Education, Briggs v. Elliott and the
other cases decided by the Supreme Court in the same opinion, hereinafter
referred to as the "Segregation Cases," were brought against boards of edu-
cation praying relief in the form of injunctions and declaratory judgments
on the grounds that the action of the school boards, in denying admission
to colored students, deprived those students of their right to equal protec-
tion of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.5 Some of the
school boards were acting under state statutes which provided that segre-
gation must be maintained.6 The Brown decision rendered these statutes
unconstitutional. But even where there is no such statute, there seems to be
little if any doubt but that the action of a school board in denying admis-
sion to a student because of race constitutes state action so as to bring it
within the proscription of the fourteenth amendment. It has been held that
the action of the curators of a state university in refusing admission to an
applicant on account of race is state action.' There is little dissimilarity
between the curators of a state university and a board which administers
a state public school.
Unfortunately, the decrees in the Segregation Cases are binding only
upon the school boards named in the actions as the decree of a federal dis-
trict court is binding only upon immediate defendants in any particular
suit. "Strangers to a decree are not bound by it."' Hence excluded students
in other school districts in the same state as well as those in other states
will probably find it necessary to bring similar actions in order to have the
declarations made universally binding.
The necessity for bringing these separate suits to obtain decrees declar-
ing each instance of school segregation unconstitutional means unavoidable
delay. But the delay should be short and the actions mere formalities. Al-
though, as in the "Segregation Cases," no mandatory injunction ordering
desegregation is likely to be granted since the second Brown decision allows
a reasonable time for administrative difficulties to be removed,9 the district
courts will find it hard not to issue declaratory judgments following the
Brown precedent.
Once there is no further question as to the unconstitutionality of any
state law or practice which keeps public school segregation in force then
the further remedies discussed infra may be utilized to make integration
a reality.
The Civil Rights Acts
A potential means of enforcing the Brown decision is derived from that
body of legislation known as the Civil Rights Acts." These laws have been
5 Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 1.
6 Briggs v. Elliot, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; S.C. CONST. Art. XI § 7; S.C. COma § 5377 (1942).
7 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 343 (1938).
8 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS 718 (1891).
9 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
1042 U.S.C. §§ 1981-94 (1952) ; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-44 (1952).
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on the books with little change since shortly after the Civil War. They were
designed to protect from infringement the rights guaranteed by the newly
adopted fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and provide both civil and
criminal remedies."
The application of the statutes providing civil remedies will be dis-
cussed. The first of these is section 1983 of Title 42 U.S.C. which provides
for damages in a civil suit against a person who, under color of state law,
denies to another person any of the rights secured by the federal Consti-
tution.
Would the members of a public school board who denied a student ad-
mission to a public school solely on the ground that he was colored be sub-
ject to a suit under this section? The answer is not clear. The first requisite
is an act under color of state law. It is not necessary that the act in ques-
tion be authorized by state law in order that it constitute an act under color
of state law.'- Thus, the action of a school board, acting of its own volition,
in promulgating a segregation rule, will still be action under color of state
law as long as it is acting pursuant to its authority derived from the state
(in this case the authority to regulate admission to public schools). Where
the board is merely carrying out the terms of a state statute which requires
segregation it would clearly be acting under color of state law.
Another requisite is the denial of a right secured by the federal Consti-
tution. The Brown decision has established that there is a denial of the
equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment where a stu-
dent is denied admission to a public school on the basis of his color. Such
conduct by the school board would apparently come within this requisite.
However, there is one problem which might prevent a recovery in a civil
suit instituted under the Civil Rights Acts. That is the common law tort
immunity which has traditionally been afforded to public officials. On read-
ing the act one would conclude that Congress had intended it to apply to all
officers of the states. As the act is directed at persons who act "under color
of any statute," the reasonable inference is that it would apply to any state
officer for he is in a particularly suitable position to act under a state stat-
ute. But this is not the case. Some public officials have been permitted to
plead, as a defense in a civil suit under the Civil Rights Acts, the common
law doctrine of tort immunity which has been afforded public officers in tort
actions at common law. In the leading case of Tenney v. Brandhove13 the
Supreme Court held that members of a legislative investigating committee
were immune from a civil suit under the Civil Rights Acts for an alleged
deprivation of constitutional rights by wrongfully having a witness sen-
tenced for contempt. This conclusion was reached on the assumption that
the Civil Rights Acts were not intended to abrogate the common law immu-
nity doctrine. On the same theory the courts of appeal have held judges
11 Ibid.
1
2 Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (D.C. Ga. 1947).
13 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 369 (1951).
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and prosecuting attorneys immune.14 Unless the courts change this inter-
pretation of the Civil Rights Acts, any suit under it will be fruitless when
brought against a legislator, judge or prosecuting attorney who is acting
within the scope of his office. Of course, if he is acting outside his authority
he is only "colorably" in office and it would seem the immunity doctrine
will be inapplicable.
As to state legislators and judges it might be sound policy to afford them
complete freedom of action without fear of harassment by civil suits aris-
ing out of each exercise of discretion. But the need for such tort immunity
is not as appealing in the case of administrative bodies such as school
boards. This view was taken in Cobb v. City of Malden,5 where it was
held that aldermen were not immune from suit under the Civil Rights Acts.
But there seems to be a qualification to this holding. The Cobb case merely
held a cause of action was stated. Judge Magruder established a test by
which the tort immunity doctrine would apply unless defendants "realized"
their conduct amounted to a violation of a constitutional right (in that case
it was impairment of contract). Until there is a more definite ruling the test
then seems to be one of good faith. Therefore, a student denied admission
to a public school by the school board might, in order to avoid the conse-
quences of the tort immunity doctrine and have relief under the Civil Rights
Acts, be required to show a lack of good faith by the board members, or
possibly an express intent to deprive him of his constitutional rights.
The second of the Civil Rights Acts providing for civil remedy is
42 U.S.C. 1985 (3). It provides for the award of civil damages to an injured
party where "two or more persons in any state or territory conspire...
for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws .... ,116
It is to be noted that this section contains no requirement that defend-
ants act under color of state law. It might be assumed, therefore, that such
action was not required. However, the Supreme Court has cast doubt on
this assumption. In Collins v. Hardyman17 the court failed to find an ac-
tionable suit for conspiracy where private citizens forcibly broke up a
meeting called by the plaintiffs to petition the United States government.
It held defendants must in some way "influence the law" in order to come
within this statute. The court quoted dictum from United States v. Cruik-
shank' which said the fourteenth amendment protects the individual from
state action only and not from action by individuals. The import of this
decision is that Congress is without power to pass such a statute without
requiring state action. But this result may not be such a handicap to the
solution of the segregation problem; for usually segregation in schools is
14 Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Skinner v. Nehrt, 242 F.2d 573 (7th Cir.
1957).
15 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953).
16 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1952).
17 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
18 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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brought about by public officials who, due to their offices, would be acting
under color of state law and, therefore, be amenable to the act specifically
under section 1983. However, it leaves unredressed by the Civil Rights
Acts certain public pressures such as groups of individuals physically bar-
ring students from schools.
The Civil Rights Acts specifically provide for money damages. This
may be an adequate means of establishing a plaintiff's legal rights and if
damages can be shown to be substantial it may act as a deterrent to future
infringements. However, plaintiff in a suit under the Civil Rights Acts may
also be granted an injunction to restrain any future interference with his
rights. 19 But plaintiff must satisfy the usual equity requirements by a show-
ing of irreparable injury. 0 A threat of continued deprivation of rights
could satisfy equity requirements.
The remaining sections dealing with civil rights under Title 42 U.S.C.
are not of great importance in the solution of segregation cases. However,
there remains to be discussed the criminal sanctions under the civil rights
legislation.
The criminal sections afford the Attorney General a means to discour-
age segregation. The important sections here are 18 U.S.C. 241 and 18
U.S.C. 242 which roughly correspond in substance to 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)
and 42 U.S.C. 1983, respectively.
Under the present construction given section 241, it will be of little
help in the segregation area. It provides for a fine or imprisonment (up to
$5000 or 10 years) where two or more persons conspire to injure any citi-
zen in the exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. In United States v. Williams2' the Supreme Court held that
section 241 protected only those rights arising from the substantive powers
of the federal government and not rights which the federal Constitution
guarantees against abridgment by the states. Thus, a violation of the equal
protection of the laws provision of the fourteenth amendment would not
be actionable under this section.
However, it has been held that section 242 was enacted to enforce the
fourteenth amendment.' This section provides for fine or imprisonment
for one who, under color of any statute, willfully subjects another to the
deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitu-
tion. It should be noted here that a specific intent is required, viz., to will-
fully deprive one of a federally protected right.3 Except for this added
requirement of wilfullness the requisites for liability would be the same
for criminal liability under this section as were necessary under 42 U.S.C.
1983. Of course, the tort immunity of public officials would not arise in
19 Morrison v. Wlliams, 149 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1945).
20 Whisler v. City of West Plains, 137 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1943).
21341 U.S. 70 (1951).
= Screws v. United States, 325 US, 91, 98 (1945).
2 3 Ibid.
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criminal prosecutions as it does in civil suits under the Civil Rights Acts.
Under pressure of the threat of a criminal prosecution school board mem-
bers would tend to act honestly where their conduct could deprive a student
of his constitutional rights.
The Civil Rights Act of 195724 has added little toward an immediate
solution of the segregation problem. It provides for the appointment of a
committee to study the civil rights problem, including present laws and
specific denials of equal protection under the Constitution. However, it
gives the federal district courts jurisdiction of civil suits " ... to recover
damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights. .. " This provision expressly
gives the power to grant injunctions but, as was mentioned above, it already
possessed such power. It might, however, obviate the requirement that
plaintiff make a showing of irreparable injury or the like to satisfy the
equity requirements usually required for the granting of an injunction.
Bell v. Hood
In addition to the civil rights legislation there is another remedy avail-
able to those seeking to prevent avoidance of the Brown decision. Under
the authority of Bell v. Hood,5 decided in 1945, injunctive and declaratory
relief can be obtained to prevent infringement of constitutionally protected
rights without the necessity of reliance upon a statute. The relief may be
obtained in a suit directly under the Constitution and, unlike a suit under
the Civil Rights Acts, there is no need to show a conspiracy or action under
color of state law. The action in Bell v. Hood was brought in the federal
district court under 28 U.S.C. 24, which authorizes federal district courts
to try suits of a civil nature where the matter in controversy "arises under
the Constitution or laws of the United States" whether these suits are at
equity or law. The plaintiffs alleged that their rights under the fourth and
fifth amendments to the United States Constitution had been invaded by
agents of the F.B.I. The complaint sought money damages in excess of the
$3000 required for federal jurisdiction and grounded the right of recovery
on the Constitution unimplemented by statute. The district court dismissed
the action for want of jurisdiction and the circuit court of appeals affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It was held that
where a complaint is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, the federal district court must enter-
tain the suit except where the" claim appears to be immaterial and made
solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where it is wholly insub-
stantial and frivolous. The question of whether or not the federal courts
can grant money damages for violation of rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution even though there is no act of Congress expressly authorizing such
relief had never been before the court and was not presented by this appeal.
24 71 STAT. 638 (1957).
2327 U.S. 678 (1945).
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But the court ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action upon which
relief could be granted saying:
'... [Wihere federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been
the rule from the beginning that the courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled, that
where legal rights have been invaded and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done." 26
On remand, the district court again dismissed the action but this time
on the ground that it could not grant money damages in the absence of a
federal statute authorizing such relief.27 The suit was against F.B.I. agents
acting outside the scope of their authority and the court said that viola-
tions of the fourth and fifth amendments cannot be the basis of any cause
of action for damages against individuals unless Congress provides for it.
Though the plaintiffs in Bell v. Hood failed to recover civil damages,
nonetheless they did establish a basis for declaratory and injunctive relief
directly under the Constitution. This can be of vital importance in stopping
the means of evasion which cannot be handled under the Civil Rights Acts
due to the requisite of action under color of state law. Under the authority
of Bell v. Hood, school boards and persons injured by segregation in public
educational institutions may proceed free from economic coercion and
other public pressures such as those mentioned in the companion article
at page 54 of this volume. These pressures and coercive practices could
proceed with impunity were the Civil Rights Acts the only means of relief.
However, under the authority of Bell v. Hood, individuals, not acting under
color of state law and not acting in concert, may still be enjoined or have
declaratory judgments rendered against them when they interfere with the
right of Negro students to attend desegregated public schools. Since Brown,
this right should be deemed federally protected and as such, a proper sub-
ject of protection by the federal courts.
The Contempt Power
In order to combat the more serious forms of evasion, it may be neces-
sary to resort to the potent contempt power of the federal courts. Where
persons against whom decrees have been rendered fail to heed them, where
persons against whom no decree has been rendered but who have full knowl-
edge of an existing decree act in a manner clearly calculated to defeat the
aim of a court's mandate or where local federal district judges procrasti-
nate in granting relief in the spirit of the Brown decision upon facts which
clearly indicate that such relief is appropriate, a contempt citation may be
a useful coercive tool. Few persons will be unmoved by the imminent threat
of harsh fines or humiliating imprisonment. It should be noted that the im-
2 Ibid.
2771 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
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munity which may or may not be available to governmental officials in suits
for damages under the Civil Rights Acts is clearly unavailable to protect
them from a contempt citation.2" Any policy reasons which may uphold the
tort immunity doctrine under the Civil Rights Acts are outweighed by the
stronger necessity for having the lawful order and process of the courts
carried out.
The power of the federal courts to punish for contempt is set out in the
United States code. 9 It is available in two forms, viz., civil and criminal.
Civil contempt is generally available to a successful plaintiff in order to
inforce his decree against a defendant who is reluctant to obey. A contempt
is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, i.e., serves only
the purposes of the complainant and is not intended as a deterrent to of-
fenses against the public." A plaintiff is more likely to choose civil con-
tempt as a remedy than criminal, since in the former the evidence require-
ment is merely clear and convincing3' rather than the more difficult beyond
a reasonable doubt needed for the latter.3
In the typical segregation situation, the threat of civil contempt should
be more than adequate to induce a reluctant school board to admit a student
after a declaratory judgment or decree has been rendered in his favor or
to effectively prevent hindrance from the public when a school board de-
cides to carry out integration on its own initiative. It has been held that a
school board is entitled to an injunction to enable it to proceed with inte-
gration free from interference3 and a civil contempt citation should readily
issue against any of the named defendants who subsequently do so interfere.
Civil contempt has also been suggested as a remedy to possible willful
judicial delay caused by reluctance on the part of federal district judges to
act in the spirit of the Brown decision. Where such a judge unreasonably
refuses or unnecessarily delays in granting the relief prayed for in a case
where the decision in the "Segregation Cases" clearly calls for the granting
of such relief, the plaintiff may appeal to the court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus directing the procrastinating judge to act in accordance with
the Brown holding.34 If the mandamus issues and the judge disregards it
he may be cited for civil contempt by the court of appeals. Though such a
procedure is possible, the success of such a request for mandamus and a
subsequent citation for contempt seems doubtful at the present time. The
Supreme Court in the second Brown case gave federal district courts dis-
cretion in the matter of time, when that court stated that integration was
to take place with "all deliberate speed."35 Consequently, an affirmative
28 62 STAT. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1952).
w 62 STAT. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1952).
30McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939).
81 Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929).82 Russell v. United States, 86 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1936).
88 Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
84 See note 27 supra.
35349 US. 294 (1955).
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showing that, by refusing to grant relief, the judge is abusing his discretion
will be difficult to make. Though the passage of time itself may prompt the
circuit courts to hold that the "all deliberate speed" directive is not being
met, it seems apparent from most of the current cases that as yet sufficient
time has not elapsed.30
Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is not used for the purpose of
enforcing decrees but rather to vindicate the dignity of the court whose
authority the defendant has flouted by refusing to obey or by acting in a
manner designed to prevent the carrying out of the decree.' It can be of
special significance in the effort to prevent evasion of the Brown decision.
It has been held, in contrast to civil contempt where only those persons
bound by the decree are subject, that in criminal contempt those who have
actual notice of an existing decree may be held in contempt when their
actions so warrant. 38 Consequently, persons in a community where a decree
to integrate has been issued will not be prone to interfere, even though they
were not parties to the litigation. And though difficult to foretell just what
type of interfering conduct will reward the interferant with a criminal con-
tempt citation, it has been held that acts complained of to constitute con-
tempt of court need not actually obstruct the administration of justice or
necessarily have that result if the tendency is of that character.39 Hence,
persons who actively work to frustrate an integration decree by such means
as economic coercion, threats, intimidation and related means may be
forced to pay heavy fines or serve jail sentences.
Though criminal contempt is a crime4 ' and prosecution for it is usually
brought by the United States Attorney, it may be prosecuted by the court
on its own motion or the court may appoint the plaintiff's attorney for this
purpose.41 The latter situation is desirable when the plaintiff or his attorney
are the court's only means of information, as in cases where the contempt
is not committed in the presence of the court. This latter procedure can be
a convenient and effective implement in the hands of an excluded student
with a decree. If the need arises he may avail himself of the benefits of
SOFor an illustration of reluctance on the part of a federal district judge to issue injunc-
tive relief to excluded negroes and of the circuit court's refusal to intercede, see Judge Atwell's
action in Bell v. Rippey, 133 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Tex. 1955), reversed in 233 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.
1956). Rehearing on the merits in 146 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Tex.1956). The plaintiffs apparently
declined further appeal in view of the decision by the Court of Appeals, in Avery v. Wichita
Falls Indep. School Dist., 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957), where a similar refusal to issue an
injunction was ratified by the court on the ground that the district judge was reasonably exer-
cising his discretion.
For an example of the questionable use of discretion by a district judge see Clemons v.
Board of Educ. of Hilisborough, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956). See also McSwain v. Board of
Educ. of Anderson County, 104 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Tenn. 1952) (injunction denied). Re-
versed and mandate to comply issued in 214 F.2d 131 .(6th Cir. 1954).
37 Clay v. Waters, 178 Fed. 385 (8th Cir. 1910).
38 United States v. Ship, 302 U.S. 563 (1906).
39 Conley v. United States, 59 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1932) ; 62 STAT. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C.
§401 (1952).
40 United States v. Jacoby, Fed. Cas. No. 15460 (W.D. Tenn. 1871).
41McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1935).
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criminal contempt without time-consuming investigation by the United
States Attorney.
Under existing law, a defendant in a contempt proceeding is not usually
entitled to a jury trial. A jury trial is never afforded in a civil contempt
proceeding and is required in criminal contempt only where the act also
violates a state or federal criminal statute. 2 Though Southern congressmen
fought long and hard to provide a right to a jury trial in contempt proceed-
ings growing out of civil rights cases, their 1957 jury trial amendment to
the Civil Rights Acts was voted down.43 The fact that the right to a jury
trial was so ardently desired by segregationists demonstrates their fear of
its effectiveness in combatting attempts to avoid integration. Without the
aid of a biased local jury there is little doubt but that citations will issue
when needed. The life tenure of federal judges is generally considered to
render them relatively free from the local pressures which often beset
elected officials. Though their own prejudices may deter them it is felt that
a judge would be more likely to find a defendant guilty of contempt than
would a jury composed of sympathetic segregationists.
The contempt power should prove to be a powerful weapon in cases
where the Civil Rights Acts prove to be inadequate or inapplicable. Where
the student litigant has a decree ordering his admission, where a school
board has an injunction guarding its right to proceed with integration and
where an injunction has issued to protect constitutionally guaranteed rights,
the ever present threat of punishment for contempt may be the straw that
will break the back of die-hard resistance to inevitable compliance with
the Supreme Court's mandate in the "Segregation Cases."
Who May Sue
Legal remedies do not enforce themselves and consideration should be
given to the problem of which persons or organizations are in a position to
take the initiative in defeating attempts to avoid integration.
The right to bring legal action to enforce the Brown decision accrues
to persons injured by failure to integrate. Of first consideration in this
regard is the barred student himself. Since the student who is denied the
privilege of enrolling will usually be a minor, the suit must be brought for
him by some legally recognized person or organization. A suit in the stu-
dent's name for damages under the Civil Rights Acts or for equitable relief,
in the form of injunction and declaratory judgment, under authority of the
Civil Rights Acts, the Brown decision itself or Bell v. Hood, may be brought
by a next friend,44 parent or guardian45 or even an organization such as a
school board.46
4238 STAT. 738 (1914), 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1952).
43 Time, Vol. LXIX, No. 25, p.25 (June 24, 1957).
44See Bell v. Rippey, 133 F. Supp. 811 (2d Cir. 1935).45 Ibid.
46 Supra note 33.
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A local school board may bring the suit in a dual capacity. In Brewer
v. Hoxie School District No. 46,17 a school board which had ordered inte-
gration in pursuance to what it believed was its duty under the Constitution
as construed by the "Segregation Cases," brought a suit for declaratory
judgment and injunction against certain persons and organizations actively
seeking by threats and intimidation to prevent the planned integration. In
granting the relief prayed for, the court held that the school board not only
had a right to bring the action in the name of the students on a loco parentis
theory but also could maintain the action in its own right. The latter hold-
ing was justified on the ground that since the school board had a duty to
comply with the Brown decision, it had a correlative federally protected
right to do so free from interference. The case is an important step in the
direction of integration as it gives impetus to school boards to proceed on
their own to abolish segregation without waiting for time-consuming de-
mands and subsequent litigation by individually aggrieved students or
parents. In fact, timely action by a school board, fully confident that its
actions can be protected from coercive hindrance, may bring about inte-
gration quietly without the widespread publicity usually attendant litiga-
tion infected with such deep emotional overtones.
It is the belief of the writers of this article that integration can best be
brought about by the orderly processes of state administrative machinery.
The most troublesome situations seem to arise only where there is an oppor-
tunity for rabble-rousing extremists to fan the smoldering issue into an
inferno. The recent Little Rock incident bears mute testimony to this prop-
osition. It is believed that persons in administrative capacity will see the
handwriting on the wall and act accordingly. The Brewer case gives them
opportunity, a fortiori, the duty to proceed with an integration program
without waiting for the inevitable attention getting law suit, the result of
which will never be, due to the Brown ruling, in doubt.
As a general rule actions will not be brought in the name of one excluded
student alone but rather as class actions for the benefit of all students simi-
larly situated.4 s Ordinarily a court can issue orders and decrees binding
only those parties before it. Consequently, a school board might admit the
successful litigant to the school and bar all others until they too bring sep-
arate suits. But the utility of the class action prevents the separate suit
problem from being one of the numerous means of evasion. A single law
suit may well settle, once and for all, the segregation question in a given
jurisdiction.
Legal action to block attempts at evasion may also be brought by the
Justice Department through the United States Attorney General or his as-
sistants. Such action is authorized under the criminal sections of Civil
Rights Acts and criminal prosecutions may be brought against persons
whose conduct brings them within the statute.49
47 Ibid.48 Adams v. Lucy, 228 F.2d 619 (Sth Cir. 1955); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3).
49 62 STAT. 696 (1948); 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1942).
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As in the Little Rock situation, the Attorney General can also initiate
proceedings against state governmental officials or individuals who act in
a manner intended to prevent the carrying out of a federal court order. In
Arkansas, Governor Faubus who, by the use of National Guard troops, was
obstructing Judge Davies' order to integrate Little Rock schools, was or-
dered to appear and show cause why he should not have an injunction
issued against him." Upon his failure to show good reason for the obstruc-
tion a preliminary injunction was issued by Judge Davies.5' The Justice
Department was the moving force behind this action, and though the re-
moval of troops removed the need for a contempt citation the case is a
convenient example of the important role the Attorney General can play
in similar situations which may arise.
Conclusion
The now existing remedies available in the federal courts appear ade-
quate to cope with the problems of desegregation even though stronger
legislation would simplify the solution of these problems considerably.
Trials by prejudiced juries in civil actions for damages under the Civil
Rights Acts and the obvious fact that damages are not the desired object
of excluded students, are factors which indicate that this form of remedy
will not be used extensively. Similarly, because of the likelihood of preju-
diced juries, it appears unlikely that prosecutions for violations of the
criminal sections of the Civil Rights Acts will meet with much success,
though the threat of such action may be somewhat of a deterrent. Conse-
quently, equitable relief by way of declaratory judgments and injunctions
under the authority of the Civil Rights Acts and Bell v. Hood bolstered
by possible use of the contempt power should be the most effective and
often used tools for preventing a continuance of segregation.
The class action, brought by individually excluded students or their
representatives will probably appear much more commonly than actions
brought by governmental officials and organizations. Generally the most
effective use of legal action by the latter comes after the right to attend the
public school has been established and is primarily needed only where hard-
ship is encountered by the private litigants in the form of public pressure
and coercion.
The Brown decision lays heavy responsibility on local federal district
judges. They have discretion to determine whether the locality is proceed-
ing toward integration with "all deliberate speed." If much resistance is
encountered on their part, desegregation may lag considerably. But there
seems to be no great cause for alarm. In the majority of cases to date, dis-
trict judges have acted with diligence and alacrity. There is no reason to
assume that they will not continue to do so.
50 Time, Vol. LXX, No. 14, p.17 (Sept. 30, 1957).
5 1 Ibid.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
"The problems attendant desegregation in the deep South are considerably
more serious than generally appreciated in some sections of our country
The problem of changing people's mores, particularly those with an emo-
tional overlay, is not to be taken lightly It is a problem which will require
the utmost patience, understanding, generosity and forebearance from all
of us from whatever race. But the magnitude of the problem may not
nullify the principle. And that principle is that we are, all of us, freeborn
Americans, with a right to make our way unfettered by sanctions imposed
by man because of the work of God."1
52
52 J. Skeuy Wright, District Judge, m Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F Supp.
336 (D.C. La. 1956).
Feb., 1958] COMMENTS
